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THE OUTLOOK FOR THE PRIVATE
EQUITY MARKET
John C. McIlwraitht
INTRODUCTION
I joined Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in 1985 after graduating
from Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I was inter-
ested in a corporate law practice with a focus on representing entre-
preneurs and private businesses, areas that were well outside Jones
Day's core practice areas at the time. In fact, I was advised that there
was not a defined path to partnership in those areas and that I should
get on a large public company "team" if I wanted to make partner
down the road.
Nevertheless, I pursued the entrepreneurial path. My first client
experience was with a small leveraged buyout group whose primary
Jones Day lawyer was one of the two partners in the Cleveland office
with an active private company practice. Fortunately for me, in the
mid-1980s entrepreneurial business activity increased significantly in
Cleveland and throughout the country, and I was one of the few law-
yers at Jones Day active in the area. As a result, my client base grew
rapidly and I enjoyed a diverse and challenging practice.
After several years of representing private companies and
sources of private capital such as Primus Capital Fund, I concluded
that I would rather be a principal in a private business or venture
capital firm than a lawyer. But I recognized that having some real
business experience would increase my chances of landing such a
position. When Quantum Health Resources, a publicly traded
healthcare company that had been venture-backed, asked me to join it
as general counsel and head of its business development activities, I
made the entrepreneurial decision to resign as a partner with Jones
Day and gain the business experience I needed.
t Managing Director, Blue Chip Venture Company, Cincinnati, Ohio. This Article is an
edited version of the presentation given by Mr. McIlwraith on November 10, 2000, at the
George A. Leet Buisness Law Symposium at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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Quantum provided me with great insight into what really goes on
at a young, fast-growing public company. I was involved in all as-
pects of the company's interaction with investment bankers, analysts,
and institutional shareholders. I was also in charge of the company's
strategic investments in and acquisitions of private companies. The
learning provided during my two years with Quantum is invaluable to
me as a venture capitalist as I help companies grow their businesses.
Quantum was sold to a much larger company two years after I
joined, and I became part of that company's senior management team.
Within a few months after joining the larger company I decided it was
time to join a venture capital firm or start my own. I spent the next
few months considering a number of venture capital career alterna-
tives.
In December 1996 1 was introduced to Blue Chip Venture Com-
pany, a $44 million venture capital firm based in Cincinnati, by mu-
tual friends. At the time, Blue Chip was seeking to add a third partner
as they completed fundraising for a new $100 million fund. After one
meeting with the two founding partners, during which we compared
philosophies on investing in and building growth companies, they and
I knew we would join forces. I joined Blue Chip two weeks later and
we raised a $129 million fund. That fund was followed by a $235
million fund in 1999, and we now manage over $400 million of ven-
ture capital and have investments in over eighty-five companies.
Today I will provide you with a brief overview of the growth of
the private equity industry over the past ten years. I will also discuss
recent trends in the private equity market, the role of lawyers in the
venture capital process, and the impact of these recent trends on law-
yers and their clients.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE EQUITY
There are basically two types of private equity transactions-
leveraged buyouts, or LBOs, and venture capital investments. A
typical LBO involves the acquisition of a mature company with a
history of operations and earnings. In an LBO the investors usually
own more than 50% of the company and control it. The investors
often bring in one or more members of the management team to run
the company, or back a team that identified the buyout opportunity.
In a venture capital transaction, the company is usually early-
stage, meaning pre-revenue or with initial revenues but still twelve
months or more away from profitability. The venture investors gen-
erally back an existing management team, which usually includes one
or more of the company's founders. Venture investors, whether an-
gels or institutional investors, typically own less than 50% of the
company and do not control it. They do not want to have control of
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the company, except when the company falls well short of its projec-
tions and a change in management is necessary to keep the company
afloat. Venture investors generally seek a higher rate of return on
their investments than do LBO investors-a five to ten times return
on their investment versus a three to five times return. This differ-
ence reflects the much higher degree of risk involved in a venture in-
vestment.
There are five sources of private equity capital: angels, incuba-
tors, private equity firms, strategic partners, and government pro-
grams. Angels include wealthy individuals-doctors, successful en-
trepreneurs, retired executives, and relatives. The institutional ven-
ture capital business largely developed as a result of the activities of
angel investors in the 1940s and 1950s, beginning with members of
the Rockefeller family.
In the last five years, angel investment activity has increased
substantially as we experienced a seemingly never-ending series of
successes in the public and private equity markets. There has also
been a significant increase in the number of strategic investments
made by large corporations, such as Intel, in early-stage private com-
panies. A number of high profile incubators, such as CMGI, have
been formed to take advantage of the attractive market for growing
companies.
The amount of venture capital available for investment in private
companies has grown dramatically since I began representing venture
capital firms in the mid-1980s. As shown in Figure 1, the amount
invested in funds has grown from $5 billion in 1990 to more than $60
billion in 1999, and the number of venture capital firms receiving
funding has grown from approximately 100 to over 500.
Figure 1
Amount Invested in Venture Capital Funds
(in Billions)
$70-
SS&
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
#offunds 101 61 94 122 176 202 226 336 400 518 618
Source: Venture Economics/National Venture Capital Association (NVCA).
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During this time the amount allocated by institutional investors,
such as pension funds and endowments, to investments in venture
capital funds grew from one to two percent of their assets to as much
as ten percent. Individual investors also began to invest significant
amounts in venture funds. These increases were driven largely by the
high internal rates of return ("IRR") being reported by many venture
funds, which in some cases exceeded 100% due to early investments
in company's like Amazon, eBay, and eToys. However, the decline
in the public stock markets and in technology and Internet stocks over
the past nine months appears to have started to impact the amount of
money being raised by venture funds.
The increase in the amount of venture capital available increased
the amount of venture capital invested in companies, as shown in
Figure 2. Further, as shown in Table 1, the scale of the increase re-
sulted in a much larger number of companies being funded, an ap-
proximately three-fold increase since 1990. It also resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in the average amount invested per company, from
approximately $3.9 million in 1990 to $17.1 million in the first half of
2000. There can be no doubt-an enormous amount of capital has
been chasing deals.
Figure 2
Amount Invested By Venture Capital Firms
(in Billions)
$0 ==  = = == = = = = = = : . - :.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Source: Venture Economics/NVCA.
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Table 1
Number of Companies Invested in by Venture Capital Firms and
Average Investment per Company
Year Number of Average Investment
Companies per Company
(in Millions)
1990 1481 $3.9
1991 1239 $4.2
1992 1452 $4.9
1993 1330 $5.5
1994 1418 $5.5
1995 1684 $6.7
1996 3088 $7.2
1997 3407 $8.5
1998 4034 $10.4
1999 5068 $18.9
2000 4685 $17.1
Source: Venture Economics/NVCA.
The amount of investment capital available from venture funds,
combined with a large increase in competition for investments from
angel and strategic investors and incubators, has driven the valuations
of early-stage companies seeking growth capital to extraordinary lev-
els. As Figure 3 reflects, the median pre-money valuation for compa-
nies-the value that determines how much of the company the in-
vestor receives for its investment-has doubled from the beginning of
1999 to the beginning of 2000. Amazingly, the first quarter 1999
number was probably two to three times what it was in 1990.
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Figure 3
Median Pre-Money Valuations (in Millions)
First Quarter 1999-First Quarter 2000
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$40 -
$30 - $25 $24 $
$20
$10
$0
IQ 99 2Q 99 3Q 99 4Q 99 1Q 00
At these valuations, a company will need to be worth several
hundred million dollars at the time the venture fund achieves "liquid-
ity" on its investment, through an IPO or sale of the company, in or-
der for the venture fund to earn an attractive rate of return. Consid-
ering that many of these companies have little if any revenues and no
earnings at the time of investment, achieving such a return is no easy
matter.
At Blue Chip, we have had several early-stage companies seek
financing from our firmn that expected pre-money valuations of $25
million or more with little or no revenues, no real proof of concept,
and, in some cases, a mediocre and inexperienced management team.
We have seen multiple companies pursue nearly identical business
strategies, such as buying life insurance on-line. Often, these compa-
nies had received an initial round of financing from angel investors
who valued the company at an unreasonably high level by traditional
measures. Despite the good feelings experienced by the management
team as a result of these valuation levels, they created unreasonable
expectations on the part of the management team and the investors
and made future financing rounds more difficult.
The significant increase in the levels of the public stock markets
and the post-TPO valuations of venture-backed early-stage companies
over the past three years, which in many cases exceeded $1 billion,
has further fueled unrealistic expectations on the part of entrepre-
neurs. The amount of venture capital available for investment and the
competition for attractive investment opportunities from multiple
sources resulted in such expectations often being fulfilled. But with
the pace of IPOs slowing, as shown in Figure 4, pre-money valuations
for private companies should start to decline as venture funds con-
clude they will have to wait longer than twelve to twenty-four months
[Vol. 51:423
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to achieve liquidity on their investments and that the value of the
company at liquidity will be much lower.
The competition for investments affected more than valuations.
As Figure 5 reflects, the pace at which investments were completed
also increased over the past decade. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the
period of time from the initial meeting between the venture fund and
the private company to the closing of the investment was three to five
months, depending on the amount of due diligence required and how
fast the lawyers moved. In 1999, based on our direct experience and
observations of others, the average investment took approximately
forty-five days to complete after the initial meeting. Some invest-
ments closed within weeks after the initial meeting. However, the
downturn in the public markets and the increasing feeling that the
"bubble" might have burst, has resulted in a return to a more tradi-
tional time frame for the venture capital investment process.
Figure 4
Pace of Venture Backed IPOs (in Billions)
1998 199 2M
# of Cos. 77 248 177
Source: Venture One.
Figure 5
Venture Capital Investment Process
Time from First Meeting to Closing
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II. CURRENT PRIVATE EQUITY TRENDS
As I previously noted, the downturn in the public equity markets
and the slowing of the number of IPOs being consummated over the
past nine months has had a noticeable effect on the private equity
markets. As a result, there will likely be changes in many aspects of
the private equity investment process, from the role of the venture
capitalist and the sources of private equity, to the form of the invest-
ment documents for a transaction and the role of the lawyer in the
process.
From 1997 through 1999, the free flow of private equity capital
from multiple sources and the apparent ease of going from start-up
stage to IPO, even before proving the business model, caused entre-
preneurs to change their approach to raising equity capital. Instead of
seeking out investors who would add value to the process of building
the entrepreneur's business beyond the capital, entrepreneurs sought
one thing-a high valuation for their companies regardless of the
source of the capital. As a result, companies often received funding
from: angel investors who offered only capital and a high valuation;
strategic investors who offered capital and a high valuation, but often
attached strings relating to business relationships and rights; and
newly-formed venture capital firms whose partners had little experi-
ence in helping build young, high-risk enterprises.
In many cases the companies being funded had a questionable,
or at least unproven, business model. Many "pure play" dot-coin
companies were in this category. Business strategies tied to
"monetizing eyeballs" and business-to-business exchanges that would
"disrupt" the natural order of business relationships were the rage.
Traditional business rules were ignored, and companies pursued their
strategies with incredible rates of spending or "cash bum," fueled by
a seemingly unending supply of private, and sometimes public, capi-
tal. An IPO was a foregone conclusion in the eyes of many entrepre-
neurs and their investors.
The short time to IPO or other liquidity events for venture-
backed companies also changed the behavior of venture capital firms.
They made investments in a larger number of companies per partner
since less work was required to build the companies and achieve fol-
low-on rounds of financing or liquidity. They also began limiting the
amount of the investment round that they would syndicate, or share,
with other venture funds. In many cases venture funds "loaded-up"
on what they considered to be a good deal. Finally, venture funds
softened the terms of their investments and the investment docu-
ments. They were so worried about losing an investment to the com-
petition that they waived traditional terms giving them a degree of
control if the company became troubled. We even saw examples of a
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"lead steer/herd" phenomenon, where venture funds rushed to join a
lead investor in a hot deal with little regard to conducting due dili-
gence on the company's business model and management team.
Recently, companies and investors are learning how fast things
change. Angel investors are pulling back from "committed" invest-
ments as the value of their public stock portfolios shrinks. At the
same time strategic investors, such as Intel and MarchFIRST, have
slowed the flow of investments into private companies as the period
of time required to achieve liquidity increases substantially and their
core businesses are adversely impacted by the market downturn. The
pace of IPOs has slowed, and early-stage companies with little or no
proof of a sustainable business strategy are finding no interest from
the public markets. Private companies are struggling to grow, or even
stay in business, as planned later round financings take much longer
to consummate and angel and strategic investors refuse to provide the
"bridge" financing necessary to allow continued growth until the next
round closes. Management teams are being "forced" to build a real
business, and investors have to work hard with management to create
value and earn a return.
At the same time, venture funds appear to be paralyzed and
confused as they consider new investment opportunities while trying
to save companies in their current portfolio that are running out of
money pursuing a questionable business model. Companies are
finding that investment terms and documents have gotten much
tougher, and that venture funds are in no particular hurry to close new
investments. Venture funds are returning to basics, seeking to invest
in businesses with early proof of a viable business model and
customers and to co-invest with one or more firms in a financing
round.
We have seen several painful examples in the public markets of
the change in investor sentiment. Once high-flying public companies
that were venture-backed and have not proven their business model
have seen their share price drop to as little as ten percent of the high.
Drugstore.com, Healtheon, and Pets.com, and public incubator
CMGI, are prime examples.
Pets.com is a great example of the excesses of the past two years.
The company was formed in February 1999 and raised approximately
$110 million of venture capital through four rounds over eight
months. The company went public in March 2000, fourteen months
after its formation, and had a $300 million market capitalization. It
generated $150 million in operating losses through June 2000,
including spending $25 million on Super Bowl ads. Today the
company is out of business, having failed to convince people to buy
dog food and other pet products online. The venture fund investors
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lost their entire investment, unable to cash-out in the months after the
IPO.
Ii. THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS
In a typical venture capital investment transaction the lawyers
have three basic roles: (1) assisting their respective clients (the com-
pany and the investors) with the outline of the key terms of the in-
vestment, usually through the negotiation of a term sheet; (2) drafting
or reviewing and commenting on the investment agreements con-
taining the agreed-upon terms; and (3) conducting legal due diligence
on matters such as the company's capitalization, governance docu-
ments, and material contracts. Although the length of the documents
and the "side" they favor ebbs and flows with the market, there are
almost always four basic agreements: a stock purchase agreement,
which sets forth the terms of the purchase of shares and contains rep-
resentations, warranties, and covenants of the company and the in-
vestors; a shareholders agreement, which contains provisions provid-
ing for board of directors representation and share transfer restric-
tions; an amendment to the company's articles or certificate of incor-
poration, which contains the terms of the preferred stock being pur-
chased; and a registration rights agreement, which contains provisions
with respect to the future public offering and sale of the shares pur-
chased by the investor.
In most cases these documents, while heavily negotiated by the
lawyers, will never be looked at again after the closing unless the
management team and the venture capitalists become adversaries over
the progress or direction of the business or over how the value created
should be shared at the time of an IPO or sale of the company. That
being said, they require special attention by the lawyers up front.
Counsel for the investors needs to not only make sure the agreements
contain the agreed upon terms, but must also tailor his or her "form"
agreements to the company and its business. For example, if it's a
technology company, the representations and warranties should in-
clude a focus on intellectual propriety rights and ownership. Too of-
ten the agreements remain in their "form" state failing to cover the
matters most important to the investor, but including provisions that
are irrelevant (e.g., an extensive environmental representation when
the company is a technology consulting firm located on the twentieth
floor of a downtown office building).
The negotiation of the investment documents is often the most
difficult and stress-producing part of the transaction, particularly
when one of the party's lawyers has little experience dealing with
"standard" venture capital investment documents. Lawyers fre-
quently argue endlessly over provisions that, over the life of the in-
vestment, will have little relevance to the success of the company or
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the investment. Often the clients-the venture capitalist and the CEO
of the young company-are drawn into the argument with no real
appreciation for whether the argument is worth having. By the time
of closing the parties have lost the feeling of partnership that was cre-
ated at the moment the letter of intent or term sheet was signed. The
tension created adversely affects the ability of the management team
to make the best use of its newfound capital and of the investors to
help management build the business.
A good lawyer can make a big difference in how efficiently and
smoothly a venture capital investment transaction is consummated.
Rather than competing with the other side's lawyer regarding a finer
point in the standard two to three page employee benefits plan repre-
sentation, the lawyer should spend time with his client to determine
what matters are really important and negotiate with these matters in
mind. If the lawyer is representing the investor, he or she might de-
termine what aspects of the company's business creates the value that
has the investor excited (e.g., proprietary software) and then make
sure the agreements contain relevant provisions. If the lawyer is rep-
resenting the company, the focus might be on the investor's ability to
control the company or dictate the terms of future financings through
covenants.
Each side's lawyer should discuss with his client the various
provisions in the documents, their purpose and the likely points of
tension during the upcoming negotiations. It may also be desirable
for company counsel to proactively review with the client whether it
has alternatives if the venture financing is unsuccessful, either be-
cause of a breakdown in the negotiations over the agreements (rare)
or a change in the markets or the venture capitalist's focus or thinking
while the investment documents are being negotiated (more com-
mon).
When reviewing a pending investment transaction with Blue
Chip's counsel I ask him or her to: (1) make the investment docu-
ments consistent with the term sheet; (2) focus the representations and
warranties on the areas that are specific to the company's business;
(3) conduct a basic negotiation of the documents with the company's
counsel, being as practical as possible, and provide me with a short
list of the issues I should care about; (4) provide me with practical
guidance and solutions on those issues; and (5) do e,¢erything he or
she can to cause our new partner, the company's management team,
to think well of Blue Chip and, most of all, not kill the deal. The
same request should be made of company counsel.
The "new economy" and the use of the Internet in the private eq-
uity process will create new challenges for lawyers. We are already
seeing widespread dissemination of "private" placement memoranda
for financings via e-mail, in many cases in clear violation of the "no
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public offering" restrictions imposed by the private placement ex-
emptions under the Securities Act of 1933. The number of invest-
ments made by "under"-sophisticated angel investors in extremely
high-risk, very early-stage companies is staggering. In many cases
the angel cannot properly assess the company's real potential and the
risks involved. Nor are they aware of how long, and how much more
capital and work, it will take to achieve a liquidity event. Many of
these investors will be disappointed and may seek recourse from the
company, other investors, or even the company's professional service
providers. They may also be difficult to deal with as the company
attempts to raise additional capital on terms that adversely impact the
angels.
We are also seeing "Internet age" projections-projections that
suggest the company will grow from no revenues to several hundred
million dollars of revenues in four to five years. In many cases the
assumptions underlying these projections have no basis in reality or
history. They are simply what the company's management deter-
mined would need to be shown to raise money at the desired valua-
tion level. Even if the company's failure to meet the projections is
not legally actionable, they create unreasonable expectations on the
part of investors and new employees.
IV. POSSIBLE IMPACT OF CURRENT TRENDS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPANIES
The correction in the public markets and apparent trends in the
private equity markets will likely lead to a slowdown in the number
and pace of venture financings. Marginal companies-very early-
stage with little proof of concept for their business strategies-will
have trouble finding private equity capital. Companies that have
completed first round financings may find it difficult to close
"planned" second round financings on schedule, making bridge fi-
nancing from current investors a necessity.
As private company valuations decline, sometimes more than
fifty percent below the last financing round level, companies will face
serious difficulties in consummating subsequent financing rounds as
earlier investors seek to protect their positions through anti-dilution
provisions or threats of legal action. Capital structure difficulties may
scare away future investors who do not want to get entangled in a dis-
pute between the company and earlier round investors. Companies
that lack experienced, deep-pocketed venture fund investors may not
be able to "bridge" the financing gaps and continue building their
business.
Companies are also finding that the once hot industry segments
are of no interest to private equity sources. Business-to-consumer
strategies, and even business-to-business strategies, are out of favor,
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affecting the availability of future financing rounds and the timing or
viability of liquidity events for companies in those markets. The
margin for error in business strategies and financing plans is very
small, requiring real focus from management, investors, and boards of
directors.
What should companies do to minimize the adverse impact of
these private equity market trends? I have a few recommendations
that are appropriate for today and have been proven over time:
Accept more money than the budget requires. Markets
change rapidly, as do sales projections. Companies should always
consider taking more money that the budget suggests is required.
We have rarely seen companies hit sales projections, and the ex-
penses of growing a young company always seem to be higher
than planned. Although taking more money results in greater di-
lution to founders and management, that dilution will matter little
if the company is successful, and will definitely not matter if the
company fails. And you never know when we will experience a
market like the one we are facing now, where even good compa-
nies are struggling to raise more capital.
Choose equity partners wisely. Even in the current market com-
panies will have choices. Angels and strategic investors are still
somewhat active. Companies need to choose their equity partners
wisely, considering the depth of the investors' resources and whether
the assistance that a venture fund can provide in the process of build-
ing a company is important. Companies also need to consider the
chemistry between management and the investors and among the co-
investors, if applicable. During tough times, which virtually always
occur over the five years it takes to build a company, these relation-
ships will be critical to keeping the company on track with minimal
distractions.
Build a real company. During the past few years many com-
panies focused almost exclusively on the exit, such as an [PO or
strategic sale, or on the next financing round, rather than focusing
on near-term business-building matters and proving the business
strategy is viable. Management teams and investors were focused
on getting rich quick. They forgot that, absent the assistance of
blind luck, the way to create value is to build a high-growth, prof-
itable enterprise. There is no such thing as easy money, even in
the venture capital business.
The recent trends will likely create additional challenges for
lawyers representing venture funds and venture-backed private com-
panies. Companies that have raised rounds of financing from diverse
investors at high valuations will face difficulties if they need to raise
more capital in a "down round." Investment agreements will be
tested. Agreements that were rushed and not reviewed carefully may
2001]
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not work in the way one or more of the parties expected. Lawyers
who are aware of a client's need for a near-term financing should
proactively consider how the terms of outstanding preferred stock or
investment agreements will impact the financing.
CONCLUSION
The "hangover" produced by the excesses of the past few years
will undoubtedly create challenges for private companies and private
equity investors over the next few years. But the historical track rec-
ord of the private equity industry and the never-ending efforts of en-
trepreneurs to build companies will cause the private equity market to
survive and thrive for years to come.
